Purpose -This paper examines whether audit quality of Chinese listed companies is affected by internal governance mechanisms (IGMs). Originality/value -The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, prior literature incompletely uncovers the impact of concentrated ownership and two-tier board system on 2 audit quality. This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of independent and interdependent effects of IGMs of Chinese characters and investigates how these IGMs jointly affect audit quality in China. Second, this paper considers the improvement of legal environment as one of external governance mechanisms (EGMs) proposed by Denis and McConnell (2003) and examine the relationship between company"s IGMs and it"s the decision for audit quality choice.
Introduction
From early 2001, corporate financial scandals involving listed companies in China (e.g., Guanxia Industry Co. Ltd, Macat Optics and Electronics Co. Ltd, Sanjiu Pharmaceutical Co.
Ltd and Lantian Co. Ltd) prompted policy-makers, regulators and officials at the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) to make corporate governance a priority issue for their agenda in 2002. The government came under increasing public pressure to improve its policy towards corporate governance structures and grant permission to a select set of accounting firms to audit public companies (DeFond et al., 2000) . Additionally and importantly, according to the WTO entry agreement, China should be committed to capital market liberalisation and corporate reform, in particular with respect to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). An effective and efficient China corporate governance system must coincide with international standards, allowing both domestic companies and foreign companies to enjoy free market competition within a fair economic and policy environment.
The purpose of this paper is to examine in a more comprehensive way than has been the case previously the key internal governance mechanisms (IGMs) of listed companies in China in their association with audit quality.
According to the Cadbury Report (1992, p. 36 ) the annual audit is "one of the cornerstones of corporate governance…The audit provides an external and objective check on the way in which the financial statements have been prepared and presented." But the effectiveness and efficiency of external auditing is subject to the actuality and the development of the corporate governance environment (Holm and Laursen, 2007) . A sound corporate governance mechanism plays an important role in enhancing the audit function because it assists in ensuring that directors and management of listed companies appoint highquality auditors who will exercise independent and effective monitoring over the financial reporting process (Lin and Liu, 2009a) .
Under agency theory, principal-agent problems stem from the complex set of contracts engaged in by the firm. Such contracts may be either explicit or implicit in the separation of ownership from control of the firm. Perhaps best known principal-agent problem is where a divergence of interests between owners and managers causes the agent (management) to fail to maximize the welfare of the principal (shareholders) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis and McConnell, 2003) . From this perspective, the audit function represents a vital corporate governance mechanism that helps shareholders in their monitoring and control of company management. The audit of a company"s financial statements makes disclosures more credible, thereby instilling confidence in the company"s transparency. Indeed, auditing has been considered to play a role in contract monitoring, as a company"s auditors contract with debtholders to report any observed breaches of restrictive covenants and audited earnings numbers are used in bonus plans (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 ). This argument is commonly accepted in prior auditing research that examines the quality of auditing (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; DeFond, 1992;  O'Sullivan, 2000; Kane and Velury, 2004; Chan et al., 2007; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Liu, 2009a, 2009b; Lin et al., 2009; Gul and Goodwin, 2010; Zerni et al., 2010; Zaman et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2011) . Some of these studies introduce corporate governance mechanism in terms of principal-agent conflicts to analyse audit quality through proxies such as audit firm size (Kane and Velury, 2004; Lin and Liu, 2009b) , audit fees (O'Sullivan, 2000; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Zaman et al., 2011) , auditor switching (Lin and Liu, 2009a; Lin et al., 2009 ) and modified audit opinions (Liu et al., 2011) . For example, Kane and Velury (2004) hypothesise that American institutional owners prefer audits conducted by large audit firms due to their belief that large audit firms provide relatively higher audit quality. Their findings confirmed the positive association between institutional ownership and audit firm size (Big 6). O'Sullivan (2000) uses audit fees as a surrogate for audit quality to examine the impact of board composition and ownership structure on audit quality in the UK prior to the adoption of the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992) . His findings suggest that audit fees have a positive correlation with the proportion of non-executive directors and a negative association with the proportion of equity owned by executive directors, but have no impact with ownership by large institutional blockholders or CEO/chairman duality. Boo and Sharma (2008) investigate the nature of the relationship between three corporate governance mechanisms (board/audit committee independence, external auditor size and regulators) for a sample of industrial firms and financial/utility firms subject to industry-specific regulation.
They find weaker relationships between audit fees and board/audit committee independence and size for regulated firms. This finding suggests that regulatory oversight partially substitutes the external audit as a monitoring mechanism. Zaman et al. (2011) examine the correlation between governance quality and auditor remuneration in the UK based on a composite measure of four dimensions of audit committee effectiveness (independence and financial expertise of audit committee members, frequency of meetings and size of the audit committee. They find a significant positive association between audit committee effectiveness and audit fees for large firms after controlling for board of director characteristics, which indicates that effective audit committees undertake more monitoring, resulting in higher audit fees.
Rather than the traditional principal-agent problem, a principal-principal problem is introduced as a major concern in relation to corporate governance in emerging economies (Dharwadkar et al., 2000) . These economies are characterized by high ownership concentration, extensive family ownership and control, and weak legal protection of minority shareholders (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008) . To moderate the principalprincipal conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders Denis and McConnell (2003) propose improving IGMs (ownership structure, board of directors and supervisory board) and external governance mechanisms (EGMs) (corporate control, legal environment and market development). However, in the context of China, EGMs such as corporate control and market development are underdeveloped and state ownership remains for most Chinese listed firms. Even reform of EGMs is an important issue but arguably a prerequisite for establishment of EGMs is to establish a series of effective IGMs because they play a substantial role at the juncture of corporate governance development in China (Hu et al., 2010) .
Using a panel data set of 117 companies with 540 firm-year observations during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , this paper examines whether audit quality for Chinese listed companies is associated with IGMs. The results reveal that foreign ownership and the number of professional supervisors are positively related to audit quality, but the size of the supervisory board shows a negative correlation. Other IGMs including state ownership, the size of the board of directors, the number of independent directors and the frequency of each of board and supervisory meetings are found not to be associated with audit quality.
In the context of studying the principal-principal agency conflict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, prior literature incompletely uncovers the impact of concentrated ownership and two-tier board system on audit quality. This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of independent and interdependent effects of IGMs of Chinese characters (i.e., highly concentrated state ownership, board of directors and supervisory board) and investigates how these IGMs jointly affect audit quality in China. Second, this paper considers the improvement of legal environment as one of EGMs proposed by Denis and McConnell (2003) . Thereby data was The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section provides an overview of the literature on audit quality in China and develops three sets of hypotheses in accordance with the IGMs to be tested. Section 3 outlines the research method and describes the data, while Section 4 presents the results of the analysis and discusses the findings. Section 5 discusses the implications of the findings and notes the paper"s limitations and future research ideas.
Literature and hypotheses
Study of corporate governance and audit quality has been drawing attention in China recently. However, none of these studies includes IGMs in a comprehensive way. For example, Chan et al. (2007) investigate whether the demand for quality-differentiated audits by listed Chinese firms is related to changes in state or institutional ownership structure. Their results suggest that a decrease in state ownership and a corresponding increase in institutional ownership results in demand for higher quality auditing by the firms. They conclude that managers of listed firms have incentives to supply credible accounting information through quality audits when the institutional features became absent. Thus, the introduction of large institutional shareholders represents a sound development in terms of economic reform in China. Lin and Liu (2009a) Chan et al. (2007) . In order to provide a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the independent and interdependent effects of different IGMs, this paper investigates how they jointly affect audit quality in the Chinese context.
Ownership structure
A dominant feature of concentrated ownership by the state is the non-tradable nature of the equity ownership, which is held either through direct investment or indirectly through holdings by domestic institutions. These institutions are entirely or partially owned by either China"s central government or its provincial governments. Thus, China"s privatisation program is different from that of many other transition economies. In China, state shareholders are recognised as the controlling shareholders and often seek objectives other than efficiency or profitability. For example, they may place a high priority on maintaining social order and affecting wealth redistribution that may favour increasing employment, rather than considerations of efficiency or profitability for public shareholders (Xu and Wang, 1999) . Lin and Liu (2009a) argue that the role of auditing in minimising principal-principal agency costs does not exist in the context of China because the controlling shareholders are also seized with the power to appoint the auditor. Thus there is motivation to select lowquality auditors in order to transfer benefits among related parties maintaining their operations and expropriating the interests of minority shareholders (Felo et al., 2003) .
The objective of foreign investors is to maximize profits and their shareholder wealth.
Most of these foreign investors are financial institutions based in developed economies such as those in Europe, North America, Japan and Hong Kong. They thereby have resources to analyse firm performance and have experience as well as capability to effect operational and management changes when profitability and efficiency are poor (Chen et al., 2006b ).
Moreover, foreign investors can play active and positive roles in bringing about improvements in corporate governance, such as by appointing a high-quality auditor. In light of the above discussion, the first set of hypotheses is formed as follows:
H1a. Ceteris paribus, state ownership is associated with lower audit quality.
H1b. Ceteris paribus, foreign ownership is associated with higher audit quality.
Board of directors
China has adopted a two-tier board system as a means to promote better governance. This choice was made in the early 1990s, partly because many directors and their enterprises were perceived to be engaged in opaque related-party transactions (Jian and Wong, 2010) . The Code, issued in January 2002 by the CSRC and the SETC, reinforces the role that the two boards (i.e., board of directors and supervisory board) are supposed to play in corporate governance. It gives particular attention to aspects of the boards. Since 2003 at least one-third of the directors on the board of directors has been required to be independent. Independence is required from both the listed company that appoints them and its major shareholders. The Code also requires that for these directors, their role in the listed company is limited to that of an independent director. Independence is argued to be important due to the behavioural motivations that flow from it, or rather from the lack of it. From this perspective, independent directors work in the best interests of the minority shareholders in order to maintain their own good reputation in society (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . This suggests that both larger boards and those with a higher proportion of independent directors will have more individuals possessing these incentives, improving the effectiveness of corporate governance and transparency of disclosures in a sensitive area such as related party transactions.
Prior literature suggests that independent directors are effective in monitoring the performance of management because they do not have a financial interest in the company in the form of shares or psychological ties to management. As such, they are expected to challenge management objectively and support the auditor (Beasley, 1996; Carcello et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; Bedard and Johnstone, 2004; Boo and Sharma, 2008) . For example, Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003) find a positive association between the proportion of independent directors and audit fees and infer that higher audit quality results. Bedard and Johnstone (2004) argue that higher proportions of independent directors on the board and audit committee are more likely to provide vigilant oversight of the financial reporting process, and their result also supports this argument.
To extend this argument, board meetings can indicate the level of diligence exercised by directors (Zaman et al., 2011) and is higher activity expected to work as a good means to discuss and solve the most widely shared problem that directors face. Hence the number of board meetings represents an important resource in improving the effectiveness of a board (Conger et al., 1998) . Carcello et al."s (2002) results support higher board meeting frequency indicating a higher level of control in the company, leading to higher audit fees. Based on a consideration of above arguments, the second set of hypotheses is formed as follows:
H2a. Ceteris paribus, the size of the board of directors is positively related to audit quality.
H2b. Ceteris paribus, the number of independent directors on the board of directors is positively related to audit quality.
H2c. Ceteris paribus, the frequency of meetings of the board of directors is positively related to audit quality. Dahya et al. (2003) outline the range of competencies required for a supervisory board to effectively fulfil its stated roles. The Code identifies four distinct types of roles that supervisory boards may undertake, depending on the independence and competencies of the board"s members; namely honoured guest, friendly advisor, censored watchdog, or independent watchdog. The role of supervisory board independent watchdog requires that members on the supervisory board have the necessary competencies in terms of knowledge and experience to act with expertise and sufficient independence. Logically, this type of supervisory board has a larger number of members with appropriate professional knowledge or work experience and hence should be in a better position to improve corporate governance. Chen (2005) argues that larger supervisory boards enhance their monitoring role. Her finding confirms a positive correlation between the size of the supervisory board and the level of corporate governance in Chinese companies. Lin and Liu (2009b) use the size of the supervisory board as a proxy to monitor the strength of this board. Their finding indicates that if there is a large supervisory board that is relatively independent from the board of directors and the management, the firm is motivated to engage a higher-quality auditor to enhance the supervision or monitoring role. Furthermore, frequent meetings of the supervisory board are expected to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the board (Conger et al., 1998) , and are more likely to reduce opaque related-party transactions. Accordingly, the third set of hypotheses is formed as follows:
Supervisory board
H3a. Ceteris paribus, the size of the supervisory board is positively related to audit quality.
H3b. Ceteris paribus, the number of supervisors with professional knowledge or work experience on the supervisory board is positively related to audit quality.
H3c. Ceteris paribus, the frequency of board meetings of supervisory boards is positively related to audit quality.
Research method

Sample and data
The data are derived from two main sources. First, the CSRC requires that all listed companies in China publish information regarding their stock issues, half-year reports, an annual report and reports in respect of important events. Annual reports are chosen for this paper as both financial and non-financial data (i.e., ownership structure and board composition) can be extracted from them. Second, the remaining financial data are sourced from the China Stock Market Finance Database (CSMAR-A) and the Trading Database (CSMAR-T) produced by the Shenzhen Guotaian Information Technology Co., Ltd. This paper focuses on the non-financial sector A-share companies listed on either the SHSE or the SZSE. In order to test the effects of various types of ownership (i.e., high levels of state and foreign investor ownership), the sample of companies is divided into three groups:
A-share, AB-share, and AH-share companies. A-share companies are companies that have listed companies within the sample frame. This results in the sample data set having a total of 540 firm-year observations.
Dependent variable
DeAngelo (1981) proposes that the independence of an auditor has positive correlation with the probability of the auditor finding and reporting misstatements or irregularities in the financial statements (i.e., providing a high-quality audit). Independence is particularly relevant to larger auditors, such as members of Big 4 which want to protect their reputation and avoid costly litigation (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Francis and Yu, 2009 ). Prior studies have substituted audit firm size as a common surrogate for audit quality (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Moore and Scott, 1989; Becker et al., 1998; Lennox, 1999 Lennox, , 2005 Kane and Velury, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Mansi et al., 2004; Lin and Liu, 2009b; Lennox and Pittman, 2010) because large auditors possess a higher degree of independence and expertise. The Big 4 audit firms is used as the proxy for audit quality (AQ) in this paper. 8 The dichotomous dependent variable-AQ is coded as 1 if the firm is audited by Big 4 audit firm, otherwise coded as zero.
Independent variables
The independent variables used to examine the factors that are expected to be associated with audit quality are divided into three main categories. The first category, ownership structure, 
Control variables
Control variables include return on assets (ROA), Tobin"s Q (TOBINSQ), firm size (FSIZE) and firm age (AGE). ROA is equal to a fiscal year's net income divided by total assets, which provides an indication of how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings.
Tobin"s Q (TOBINSQ) is equal to the market value of stock and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets, which reveals the value investors assign to a firm"s tangible and intangible assets based on predicted future revenue and cost streams. Firm size (FSIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, which is often found to have a significant impact on IGMs (e.g., Chan et al., 2007; Boo and Sharma, 2008) . Firm age (AGE) measures the number of years since initial listing.
In addition, dummy variables representing year effects (YEARDUMMY) and controlling for listing status (SHAREDUMMY) are included in alternative analyses.
Model specification
Based on the three sets of hypotheses presented in this paper and the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, the logistic regression model to be empirically investigated is as follows, where the variables are as defined the previous section:
This model is useful when examining the correlation between the probability of employing an auditor assumed to provide a greater likelihood of high audit quality and the factors of IGMs as follows: As shown in Table II Panel A, there are no Spearman correlations between independent variables that reach .8. However, multicollinearity may still be a concern, even where the bivariate correlation coefficients are low (Gujarati, 2003) . Hence, the degree of multicollinearity is examined through estimation of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). 9 The results, reported in Table II Panel B, highlight that the largest VIF is 1.97 while the remainder are below 1.68. Thus, there is no evidence of a serious multicollinearity problem being present in the regression model.
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics presented in Examining the supervisory board, the means for supervisory board size and professional supervisors are 4.59 and 1.86 respectively, and these numbers are well below the average size of board of directors and number of independent directors. Regarding the control variables-ROA and TOBINSQ, the means are .08 and 1.16 respectively. The mean TOBINSQ shows that the market value of equity of the sampled companies is high due to surging stock prices.
I suggest that these listed companies utilize the stock market as a means to benefit the controlling shareholders and expropriate the interests of minority shareholders, which is indicated by the poor ROA.  statistics for all models indicate that statistically significant components of the variation in the chosen measure of AQ are explained by variation in the set of independent variables.
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE
Regression analyses
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE
Regarding the first set of hypotheses, the coefficients for state ownership (β 1 ) are insignificant at the 5% level for all models. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is not supported. In the context of China, state shares are still retained by state asset management bureaus (AMBs) or their agencies, and are not usually allowed to be publicly traded in the market. This highly concentrated ownership (65% on average) creates principal-principal agency problems. The principal owner is the state, representing all Chinese people (Chan et al., 2007) . The management or agents represents multi-level AMBs (i.e., state AMBs, provincial AMBs, and their agents). According to agency theory, management or agents will serve the best interests of the owners. Due to lack of a clear party of ownership, no management or agent has an adequate motivation to achieve profit maximization for the principal owner -all Chinese people (Chan et al., 2007) . From the results I infer that the controlling party for state shares has no incentive to engage a high-quality auditor for the company.
The coefficients for foreign ownership (β 2 ) are positively significant at the .1% level for models (1) and (2), and at the 10% level for models (3) and (4). These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1b and suggest that the higher the proportion of equity owned by foreign investors, the more likely the engagement of a high-quality auditor. I infer a motivation to secure benefits and not have them expropriated by other parties.
In respect of the second set of hypotheses, the coefficients for board size (β 3 ) are insignificant at the 5% level for all models. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is not supported. The state/ provincial AMB or their agency relies on control over the board of directors to preserve their property rights. But arguably most directors actually represent the interests of the state because they are appointed and remunerated by the various levels of government according to their administrative rankings rather than their ability (Xu and Wang, 1999; Zhou and Wang, 2000) . Hence they may have insufficient managerial ability to monitor management"s behaviour. Furthermore, the state, through its control over the board of directors, may seek objectives other than profit maximization and place a priority on maintaining social order or reducing unemployment (Xu and Wang, 1999) .
The coefficients for the number of independent directors (β 4 ) are insignificant at the 5% level for all models. Thus, Hypothesis 2b is not supported. In the context of China, the key problem of board independence is related to the directors and managers. Most directors are insiders or executive directors, and listed companies on average only just meet the onethird ratio of independent directors required by The Guidelines since 2003. Most independent directors are appointed by the board members or controlling shareholders, hence they owe their loyalty and patronage to their appointers (Tan and Wang, 2007) . As a consequence, the independent directors of Chinese listed companies may demonstrate limited independence and easily become "window dressing" or "symbolic" as board members (Luan and Tang, 2007) .
The coefficients for board meeting activity (β 5 ) are insignificant at the 5% level on all models. Thus, Hypothesis 2c is not supported. This finding is not consistent with Conger et al.
(1998) and Carcello et al. (2002) . The frequency of board meetings may be attributable to many reasons, such as financial distress or controversial decisions on illegal or questionable activities (Vafeas, 1999; Chen et al., 2006a) and does not necessarily work as a means to enhance corporate governance.
Regarding the third set of hypotheses, the coefficients for supervisory board size (β 6 ) are negative and hence opposite to the expected sign as I hypothesized and are inconsistent with the findings of Lin and Liu (2009b) . Hence even though they are significant at the 10% level in model (1), at the 5% level in model (2) the significances cannot be used to support watchdog" is the role of the supervisory board, then perhaps what is occurring is that the more qualified the supervisory board members are, the greater the internal effort made to censor or review works about earnings management and tunneling, which could include information deemed sensitive to the board of directors and controlling shareholders. In reality, these supervisory board members could be regarded as "rubber stamp" supervisors.
The coefficients for professional supervisors on the supervisory board (β 7 ) are positively significant at the 1% level in models (1), (2) and (4) In terms of control variables, the coefficients for ROA are positively significant at the 10% in model (3) and at the 5% level in model (4), but insignificant in models (1) and (2).
The coefficients for TOBINSQ are positively significant at the 1% level in model (1) and at the 5% level in model (2), but insignificant in models (3) and (4). These findings suggest that listed companies with better profitability and market performance are more likely to hire a high-quality auditor. The coefficients for FSIZE are positively significant at least the 5% level in all models. The coefficients for AGE are positively significant at the 10% level in model (1) and at the 5% in model (2), but insignificant in models (3) and (4). These findings suggest that listed companies of larger size or longer listing status are more likely to hire a high-quality auditor.
Concerning year and share-type effects, the results indicate that there are no year effects, and positively significant share-type effect in models (3) and (4). This suggests that listed companies that issue both A-and B-shares or A-and H-shares have better are more likely to choose a high-quality auditor than listed companies that issues A-shares only.
Sensitivity test
A sensitivity test is used as an alternative technique to examine the regression model and the empirical results. According to composition of the sample presented in Panel A Table I, I perform the regression model used in Table IV 
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE
For the companies that issue A-shares only, as shown in Table V , the results are consistent with the findings in Table IV , except for insignificant coefficients for foreign ownership on models (1) and (2). This finding suggests that foreign ownership in listed companies with A-shares is only 2% in comparison with 75% of state ownership (as shown in Panel B of Table III) , and this small stake reduces the efficiency of foreign investors to actively enhance corporate governance (Chen et al., 2006b) .
Regarding the companies that issue A-and B-shares, as shown in Table V, the results are consistent with the findings in Table IV , except for a positively significant coefficient for independent directors in model (4), a negatively significant coefficient for board meetings in model (4), and negatively significant coefficients for supervisory board size in models (3) and (4). The positively significant coefficient for independent directors adds weight to the agency argument of (Fama and Jensen, 1983 ) that independent directors of these companies are motivated to work in the best interests of shareholders in order to maintain their good personal reputation, and also supports Chen and Jaggi"s (2000) findings that independent directors will improve corporate governance even in countries that have fewer incentives for transparency, such as China. The negatively significant coefficients for board meetings and supervisory board size suggest that the IGMs of board of directors and supervisory board are ineffective in enhancing corporate governance, and that the effectiveness of corporate governance can be improved by increasing the proportion of foreign equity.
In respect of the companies that issue A-and H-shares, as shown in Table V , the results are consistent with the findings in Table IV , except for negatively significant coefficients for state ownership in models (5) and (6), positively significant coefficients for independent directors and supervisory board size in model (5) and insignificant coefficients for foreign ownership in models (5) The discussion in the above two paragraphs in terms of the positive coefficient for independent directors and the insignificant coefficient for foreign ownership can be applied to the findings of AH-share companies.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether the audit quality of Chinese listed This paper also fills a gap in the literature concerning the impact on audit quality choice of high state ownership concentration and the two-tier board corporate governance system.
Notes
1 A-shares are common stock issued by mainland China firms, subscribed and traded in RMB, listed on the mainland stock exchanges, and are reserved for trading by Chinese citizens. The A-share market was launched in 1990 in Shanghai. 2 B-shares are issued by mainland China firms, traded in foreign currencies, and listed on the mainland stock exchanges. The B-share market was launched in 1992 and was restricted to foreign investors before 19 February 2001.
3 H-shares are securities of companies incorporated in mainland China and nominated by the Chinese government for listing and trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, being quoted and traded in HKD. There are no restrictions on holdings by international investors. 4 Green (1991) suggests that the power for a test of a multiple correlation with a medium effect size is approximately 0.80 if N ≥ 50 + 8m, where N is number of subjects, and m is the number of predictors. Thus, the sample size should be at least 114 (N = 50 + 8 x 8). 5 The Shanghai SSE180 Index was created by restructuring and renaming the SSE30 Index. Through scientific and objective methods it selects constituents that best represent the market. The SSE is a benchmark index reflecting the Shanghai market and serves as a performance benchmark for investment and a basis for financial innovation. 6 The Shenzhen SSE100 is a benchmark index reflecting performance in the Shenzhen market and serves as a performance benchmark for investment and as a basis for development of financial innovations. 7 These samples are randomly selected from A-share companies included in the Shanghai SSE180 and the Shenzhen SSE100 after removing dual listed companies (these being either AB-share companies or AH-share companies). 8 According to Chinese government regulation, the international Big 4 accounting firms, i.e., PwC, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young, were not permitted to provide auditing services before 2005 in China unless they became joint-ventures or partnerships with large domestic Chinese CPA firms. Thereby, the Big 4 audit firms in this paper comprise PwC ZhongTian, KPGM Huazhen, Deloitte Huayong and Ernst & Young Hua Ming. 9 The critical value of the VIF to test for multicollinearity is 10. Gujarati (2003) suggests that there is no evidence of multicollinearity unless the VIF of a variable exceeds 10. All values used in this paper are well below this critical level. The Shanghai SSE180 Index was created by restructuring and renaming the SSE30 Index. Through scientific and objective methods it selects constituents that best represent the market. The SSE is a benchmark index reflecting the Shanghai market and serves as a performance benchmark for investment and a basis for financial innovation. The Shenzhen SSE100 is a benchmark index reflecting performance in the Shenzhen market and serves as a performance benchmark for investment and as a basis for development of financial innovations. a STATE = state ownership concentration, proportion shares held by the state; FOREIGN = foreign ownership concentration, proportion of shares held by foreign investors; BSIZE = board size, the number of directors on the board; INDP = the number of independent directors on the board; BDMEET = the number of meetings of the board of directors in the fiscal year; SBSIZE = the number of members on the supervisory board; PROFSB = professionalism of the supervisory board, number of supervisory board members with professional knowledge or work experience; SBMEET = the number of meetings of the supervisory board in the fiscal year; ROA = return on total assets; TOBINSQ = Tobin"s Q, market value of stock and book value of debt divided by book value of total assets; FSIZE: firm size, natural logarithm of value of total assets at the end of fiscal year; AGE: firm age, years since initial listing b The critical value of the VIF to test for multicollinearity is 10. Gujarati (2003) a STATE = state ownership concentration, proportion shares held by the state; FOREIGN = foreign ownership concentration, proportion of shares held by foreign investors; BSIZE = board size, the number of directors on the board; INDP = the number of independent directors on the board; BDMEET = the number of meetings of the board of directors in the fiscal year; SBSIZE = the number of members on the supervisory board; PROFSB = professionalism of the supervisory board, number of supervisory board members with professional knowledge or work experience; SBMEET = the number of meetings of the supervisory board in the fiscal year; ROA = return on total assets; TOBINSQ = Tobin"s Q, market value of stock and book value of debt divided by book value of total assets; FSIZE: firm size, natural logarithm of value of total assets at the end of fiscal year; AGE: firm age, years since initial listing b A-shares are common stock issued by mainland China firms, subscribed and traded in RMB, listed on the mainland stock exchanges, and are reserved for trading by Chinese citizens. The A-share market was launched in 1990 in Shanghai. c B-shares are issued by mainland China firms, traded in foreign currencies, and listed on the mainland stock exchanges. The B-share market was launched in 1992 and was restricted to foreign investors before 19 February 2001. AB-share companies in this paper indicate those that have issued both A-shares and B-shares, with an initial A-share offering. They are also listed on the domestic stock exchanges in China. d H-shares are securities of companies incorporated in mainland China and nominated by the Chinese Government for listing and trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, being quoted and traded in Hong Kong Dollar. There are no restrictions on holdings by international investors. AH-share companies in this study indicate those that have issued both A-shares and H-shares, and have floated their shares simultaneously on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and one of China"s two mainland stock exchanges. 
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